Secure boot checklist for keys, boot chain and lockdown
Secure boot is only as strong as its weakest step. Sixteen checks across the keys, the boot chain, device lockdown and the tests that prove the other three.
Key characteristics
- Items
- 16 in four groups
- Groups
- Keys, boot chain, device lockdown, prove it
- Output
- Ticks on screen, CSV download, print
- Runs
- In your browser with nothing sent
Checklist: Secure boot checklist for keys, boot chain and lockdown
Secure boot means a device runs only firmware you signed. The idea is simple. The gaps are in the details: a signing key on a laptop, a bootloader that can itself be overwritten, a debug port left open after the factory, a check nobody has ever tried with a bad image. This checklist covers four layers: the keys, the boot chain, the device’s lockdown, and the tests that prove the other three. Each item says what it protects against. None of them makes a device impossible to attack, and together they raise the cost of an attack a long way.
How to use it
Work through it at the security review before DVT ends (see the production readiness checklist) and again before the first production build. Tick only what you have evidence for; the Prove it group exists because untested security settings are often wrong. Download the CSV as the record. Ticks are not saved if you leave the page.
The four groups
Keys
The production signing key is generated in a hardware security module or signing service; the private key is never in the source repository or on a laptop; development and production keys are separate; and there is a written plan for rotating keys and for a lost or leaked key. MCUboot’s imgtool supports RSA-2048, RSA-3072, ECDSA P-256 and Ed25519 keys. Its documentation warns that the development key distributed with MCUboot is widely shared and must never be used in production. The bootloader build needs only the public key, which imgtool can export from a public-key file without any private key material.
Boot chain
The bootloader verifies the signature of every image before it runs; the bootloader itself is write-protected or verified by the chip; older, vulnerable images are refused; and a failed check leaves the device in a known, recoverable state. MCUboot refuses downgrades in two ways: by comparing image versions, which its documentation limits to overwrite-based updates, or by a security counter kept in trusted non-volatile storage on the device. The counter can stay the same across ordinary releases and rise only when a vulnerability is fixed.
Device lockdown
The debug port is disabled or locked on production units; readout protection is enabled where the chip offers it; test and factory commands are removed or disabled in shipping firmware; and each device has its own credentials, never a shared fleet password. Without the debug lock, anyone with a probe and physical access can often read or replace the firmware and step around the boot chain entirely. Unique credentials are also a legal requirement in some markets: the UK’s product security regime requires passwords on consumer connectable products to be unique per product or defined by the user.
Prove it
An unsigned image is refused; an image signed with the development key is refused on a production unit; a downgrade to an older version is refused; and a debug connection to a locked unit fails. Each is a test you can repeat on every board revision and keep as evidence.
Reading the example
Example (fictional). Loamwick’s LW-1 firmware 1.1.0 made the probes refuse images signed with the retired development key, closing a gap left over from the prototype stage. Requirement FW-004 in Loamwick’s firmware requirements worksheet carries the matching test: try an image signed with a test key, and the device must refuse it. The debug port lock and per-unit keys belong to the production build that follows the trial.
Limits
- Microcontroller products. The checklist assumes a bootloader such as MCUboot on a microcontroller. Linux products have a longer chain (boot ROM, bootloader, kernel, root file system); see embedded Linux.
- Not a compliance checklist. It covers the firmware measures a security review will ask about. Baselines such as NIST IR 8259A describe device cybersecurity capabilities that reach well beyond boot. This page is not legal or regulatory advice.
- Chip features differ. Readout protection, write protection and debug locking work differently on each microcontroller family. Read the reference manual for yours, and test what locked means on a real unit.
What to do next
Our firmware security service sets up secure boot, key custody and debug lockdown with you, and the security page describes how we handle signing keys and client code. After that, every release follows the firmware release checklist. More in the security and compliance section of Field Update.
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