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EN 18031 and the EU RED cybersecurity rules for radios

Reader question: Our wireless product ships to the EU before December 2027: what do the Radio Equipment Directive cybersecurity rules and EN 18031 require now, and what changes when the CRA applies?

Micrograph-style illustration of the fine sensory hairs on a cricket's leg near its tiny ear membrane, with the hairs tinted amber.

If your wireless product is placed on the EU market between August 1, 2025 and December 10, 2027, and it can reach the internet or handles personal data as a wearable, toy or childcare device, the Radio Equipment Directive (RED) cybersecurity requirements in Article 3(3)(d), (e) and (f) apply to it. EN 18031, in three parts, is the harmonised standard cited in the Official Journal for those requirements, with restrictions.

Apply the relevant part in full and you may assess the product yourself; otherwise a notified body must be involved. From December 11, 2027, the RED cybersecurity act is repealed and the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) applies to units placed on the market from that day.

This guide explains each of those pieces from the legal texts themselves, as published on EUR-Lex and checked in November 2026. It covers who is in scope, what the three EN 18031 parts and their restrictions mean, when a notified body is needed, and which firmware work carries over to the CRA. It is a summary of public law and standards, not legal advice; for your product, confirm the conclusions with a notified body or counsel.

Fumbar is a Denver firmware company that writes embedded firmware for hardware startups and the over-the-air update path that keeps it improving after devices ship. It does not certify products or issue declarations of conformity. Its firmware security work helps a team build the evidence that a test lab or notified body will ask for.

What the RED cybersecurity rules are

The rules come from three legal texts. The Radio Equipment Directive defines the requirements, a delegated regulation switches three of them on for certain radios, and an implementing decision cites the harmonised standard that shows how to meet them.

The Directive: Article 3(3)

Directive 2014/53/EU, the RED, lists essential requirements that apply only to “certain categories or classes” of radio equipment once the Commission specifies them. Three of them concern cybersecurity:

  • Article 3(3)(d): radio equipment “does not harm the network or its functioning nor misuse network resources, thereby causing an unacceptable degradation of service”.
  • Article 3(3)(e): radio equipment “incorporates safeguards to ensure that the personal data and privacy of the user and of the subscriber are protected”.
  • Article 3(3)(f): radio equipment “supports certain features ensuring protection from fraud”.

The delegated act: Regulation (EU) 2022/30

Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/30, published on January 12, 2022, specifies which radio equipment those three requirements apply to. Its original date of application was August 1, 2024. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/2444 replaced that with “It shall apply from 1 August 2025.”

The Commission’s RED page confirms: “The Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/30 entered into application in August 2025.” As of November 2026, it applies.

The standard: EN 18031, cited by Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/138

Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/138, dated January 28, 2025, added EN 18031-1:2024, EN 18031-2:2024 and EN 18031-3:2024 to the list of harmonised standards under the RED. EUR-Lex records the additions in force from January 30, 2025, the day of publication. Each citation carries notices that limit the presumption of conformity, covered below.

Is your product in scope?

Your product is in scope if it is radio equipment and falls into one of the categories in Article 1 of Delegated Regulation 2022/30. The key test for most startups is whether the product can communicate over the internet, directly or through something else.

The three scope rules

  • Article 3(3)(d), network protection, applies to “any radio equipment that can communicate itself over the internet, whether it communicates directly or via any other equipment”. The Regulation calls this “internet-connected radio equipment”.
  • Article 3(3)(e), personal data and privacy, applies if the equipment can process personal data, traffic data or location data and is either internet-connected radio equipment, equipment “designed or intended exclusively for childcare”, radio equipment covered by the Toy Safety Directive 2009/48/EC, or equipment designed to be worn on, strapped to or hung from the body or clothing.
  • Article 3(3)(f), fraud, applies to internet-connected radio equipment that “enables the holder or user to transfer money, monetary value or virtual currency”.

What is excluded

Article 2 removes all three requirements from radio equipment that is also covered by the medical device Regulation (EU) 2017/745 or the in vitro diagnostic Regulation (EU) 2017/746. It removes (e) and (f), but not (d), from equipment covered by the civil aviation Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, the vehicle type-approval Regulation (EU) 2019/2144 and the electronic road toll Directive (EU) 2019/520.

What “personal data” and “manufacturer” mean here

The personal data test in Article 1(2) borrows its definitions. Personal data and processing are defined as in Article 4 of the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679, and traffic data and location data as in Article 2 of the ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC. A device that stores a user’s name, a home location or a usage history linked to an account is likely processing personal data in that sense.

The RED defines the manufacturer as the person who “manufactures radio equipment or has radio equipment designed or manufactured, and markets that equipment under his name or trade mark”. A startup that has a contract manufacturer build its product and sells it under its own brand is the manufacturer. The obligations stay with you, not with the factory or the radio module supplier.

A pre-approved radio module helps with the radio tests, but your product is the radio equipment placed on the market. In our reading, the module maker’s documents do not cover what your firmware and app do with the network and with personal data, so plan to document those yourself.

Reading “via any other equipment”

The phrase “whether it communicates directly or via any other equipment” matters for Bluetooth LE, Thread and sub-GHz products. Read literally, a sensor whose data reaches the internet through a phone app or a gateway can count as internet-connected radio equipment, even though its own radio never speaks IP. Treat that as the working assumption and confirm it for your product with your notified body or counsel.

Product type (generic) (d) network (e) personal data (f) fraud
Wi-Fi or cellular sensor reporting to a cloud Likely If it processes personal, traffic or location data Only if it moves money
Bluetooth LE sensor that reaches the cloud through a gateway or phone Likely, under “via any other equipment” Same test Only if it moves money
Fitness band or other wearable with a radio If internet-connected Likely, as wearable equipment Only if it pays
Radio-equipped toy or baby monitor If internet-connected Likely, as toy or childcare equipment Rarely
Radio product that is also a medical device under (EU) 2017/745 Excluded Excluded Excluded

The table is a first reading of Article 1 for common product types, not a legal determination for yours.

Smart home devices built on Matter face the same tests whether they use Thread or Wi-Fi; transport choice and Matter certification are covered in Matter over Thread or Wi-Fi.

Example (fictional). Loamwick’s LW-1 probes send soil readings over Bluetooth LE to a solar gateway, which forwards them over LTE-M cellular. For example, suppose Loamwick plans an EU field trial with units placed on the market in 2027.

The gateway communicates over the internet directly, so (d) applies to it. The probe reaches the internet “via any other equipment”, the gateway, so Loamwick assumes (d) applies to the probe as well. Readings carry plot locations, so the team also checks whether (e) applies, and records the reasoning in the technical documentation for review by its test lab.

EN 18031: the three parts and what the Official Journal says

EN 18031 is a European standard in three parts, one for each requirement. Implementing Decision 2025/138 cites all three, and each citation says where the standard does not give a presumption of conformity.

The three parts

Part Title as cited Requirement
EN 18031-1:2024 Common security requirements for radio equipment, Part 1: internet connected radio equipment Article 3(3)(d)
EN 18031-2:2024 Part 2: radio equipment processing data, namely internet connected radio equipment, childcare radio equipment, toys radio equipment and wearable radio equipment Article 3(3)(e)
EN 18031-3:2024 Part 3: internet connected radio equipment processing virtual money or monetary value Article 3(3)(f)

The standard is sold through national standards bodies. The Swiss body’s catalog summary of Part 1, for example, says it “specifies common security requirements for internet-connected radio equipment” that is “capable to communicate over the internet, regardless of whether these products communicate directly or via any other equipment” (SNV). Buy the parts that apply to your product; summaries are not a substitute for the clauses.

The notices that limit the presumption

The citations in Implementing Decision 2025/138 carry these restrictions:

  • All three parts: the sections named “rationale” and “guidance” “do not confer a presumption of conformity”.
  • All three parts, passwords: no presumption of conformity “if, when applying its clauses 6.2.5.1 and 6.2.5.2, the user is allowed not to set and use any password” (Part 2 uses “by applying” for the same notice).
  • EN 18031-2, parental control: for the classes of equipment covered by clauses 6.1.3 to 6.1.6, no presumption “if, by applying its clauses 6.1.3.4.2, 6.1.4.4.2, 6.1.5.4.2 and 6.1.6.4.2, parental or guardian access control is not ensured”.
  • EN 18031-3, assessment criteria: “As regards the assessment criteria set out in clause 6.3.2.4 of this harmonised standard”, the standard does not confer a presumption of conformity with Article 3(3)(f).

Status as of November 2026

EUR-Lex’s consolidated version of Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2191, dated November 15, 2026, still lists EN 18031-1:2024, EN 18031-2:2024 and EN 18031-3:2024 as entries 164 to 166 with the same notices. Later amendments in 2025 and 2026 added and withdrew other radio standards but did not change these entries. Check the consolidated text again before you sign a declaration, because citations can change.

Five common misreadings

  1. “BLE-only devices are out of scope.” The scope covers equipment that communicates over the internet “directly or via any other equipment”, so a Bluetooth LE device behind a gateway or phone may be in.
  2. “A lab certificate proves compliance.” The Commission says voluntary certificates “are not a recognised means to prove compliance”; only notified bodies issue certificates under the RED, and only in their notified area.
  3. “The module is already approved.” The manufacturer of the product you market carries the obligations, and the module maker’s file does not describe your firmware.
  4. “Following the guidance text is enough.” The “rationale” and “guidance” sections of EN 18031 give no presumption of conformity; the normative clauses do.
  5. “The repeal means we can wait.” Units placed on the market until December 10, 2027 remain subject to RED market surveillance, and the CRA asks for the same protections from the next day.
Restriction in the Official JournalApplies toDesign question it raises
Rationale and guidance sections give no presumptionParts 1, 2 and 3Is every design decision justified against the normative clauses, not the guidance text?
No presumption if the user may choose not to set and use any password (clauses 6.2.5.1 and 6.2.5.2)Parts 1, 2 and 3Does any setup path let a user skip the password, for example a "set it later" option in the app?
No presumption if parental or guardian access control is not ensuredPart 2, for the equipment classes in clauses 6.1.3 to 6.1.6For toys, childcare or wearables in those classes, can a parent or guardian control access?
No presumption as regards the assessment criteria in clause 6.3.2.4Part 3For payment features, how will the assessment criteria be covered, and by whom?
Figure 1. The restrictions attached to EN 18031 in the Official Journal and the design questions they raise. Restriction text from Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/138, checked against the consolidated version of Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2191 dated November 15, 2026; design questions are an editorial summary.

Self-assessment or a notified body

Whether you can assess the product yourself depends on how fully you apply EN 18031. If you apply the relevant parts in full, the RED lets you use internal production control; if you apply them only in part, or a restriction removes the presumption for a feature you rely on, a notified body must be involved.

What Article 17 says

Article 17(3) of the RED says that where a manufacturer “has applied harmonised standards the references of which have been published in the Official Journal”, it may use internal production control (Annex II), EU-type examination (Annex III) or full quality assurance (Annex IV). Under internal production control, the manufacturer “ensures and declares on his sole responsibility” that the equipment meets Article 3.

Article 17(4) covers the other case. Where the manufacturer “has not applied or has applied only in part harmonised standards”, or no such standards exist, the equipment must go through EU-type examination or full quality assurance. In EU-type examination, “a notified body examines the technical design of the radio equipment”.

Applying a standard “in full” means meeting every clause that applies to your product, not most of them. If one applicable clause is met another way, Annex V of the Directive expects the technical file to say which parts were applied and how the rest was solved, and Article 17(4) then routes the product to a notified body.

What that means in practice

  • The restrictions push products toward a notified body. If your setup flow lets a user skip a password, for example, the standard gives no presumption for the clauses involved, so relying on it alone is not enough.
  • Choose the notified body early. Notified bodies for the RED are listed in the Commission’s NANDO database; book one before the design freezes, not after.
  • Beware certificates that prove nothing. The Commission’s RED page warns that “only notified bodies may issue certificates of compliance for harmonised products”, and that voluntary certificates “are not a recognised means to prove compliance”.

Whichever route you take, the outputs are the same kind of thing: technical documentation that shows how each requirement is met, an EU declaration of conformity that, under Article 18, “shall state that the fulfilment of the essential requirements set out in Article 3 has been demonstrated”, and the CE marking.

What the technical documentation must show

Whichever route you take, the RED requires a technical file, and several of its items are about firmware. Annex V of the Directive lists the contents, and Article 10 says how long to keep them and what to do when the design changes.

The Annex V items that touch firmware

Annex V of the RED says the technical documentation shall, “wherever applicable”, contain at least these elements, among others:

  • A general description including “versions of software or firmware affecting compliance with essential requirements”.
  • “Descriptions and explanations necessary for the understanding” of the drawings and of “the operation of the radio equipment”.
  • “A list of the harmonised standards applied in full or in part”, and where standards were applied only in part, “the parts which have been applied”, plus descriptions of other solutions used.
  • A copy of the EU-type examination certificate, where a notified body was involved.
  • “Results of design calculations made, examinations carried out” and “test reports”.

Keeping it current

Article 10(4) requires manufacturers to keep the technical documentation and the EU declaration of conformity “for 10 years after the radio equipment has been placed on the market”. Article 10(5) requires procedures so that series production remains in conformity, and says “changes in radio equipment design or characteristics” shall be “adequately taken into account”.

For firmware, that turns into a release habit. Each release records whether it touches a function that supports Article 3(3)(d), (e) or (f), such as authentication, update verification or network behavior. If it does, the release reruns the relevant security tests and the technical file gets the new version and the results.

Firmware evidence worth having before the test lab visit

  • An architecture description: processors, radios, interfaces, data flows and where personal data is stored.
  • A list of every network service and debug interface, with the reason each is open or closed in production.
  • The update design: how images are signed, verified and rolled back, with test records.
  • The credential design: how each unit gets unique credentials and how passwords are set.
  • A risk assessment that links each threat to a design decision and a test.
  • The firmware version list and the release notes for every version placed on the market.

Example (fictional). For the suppose-case EU trial, Loamwick’s technical file lists LW-1 firmware v1.0.0, v1.0.2 and v1.1.0. Each release report already states what changed: v1.1.0, for example, corrects soil moisture readings that drifted upward after 30 days in wet clay.

The team adds one line to each report: whether the release touched authentication, update verification or radio behavior. For v1.1.0 the answer is no, so the existing security test results still stand; a release that changed the Bluetooth pairing code would have triggered a rerun.

Firmware work the three requirements point to

The legal text names outcomes, not mechanisms, so the firmware work is an engineering reading of each requirement. Most of it is the same work the CRA asks for from December 11, 2027, which is the strongest reason to do it properly now.

Article 3(3)(d): do not harm the network

The requirement is that the equipment does not harm the network “nor misuse network resources, thereby causing an unacceptable degradation of service”. In firmware, that usually means:

  • Reconnection with backoff and jitter, so a fleet does not reconnect in lockstep after a cloud outage.
  • No open services you do not need, such as debug shells, test ports or unauthenticated management commands.
  • Parsers that reject malformed input, so a bad packet cannot crash the device into a reboot loop that floods the network.
  • A secure update path, so a fix can reach the fleet when a network-harming fault is found.
  • Sane behavior under faults, so a watchdog reset or a failed update does not leave the radio transmitting continuously or retrying without limit.

Article 3(3)(e): protect personal data and privacy

Here the requirement is “safeguards to ensure that the personal data and privacy of the user and of the subscriber are protected”. In firmware, that points to encrypted links, access control on every interface that reads data, protected storage for credentials and personal data, and a way to delete user data when the device changes hands. Unique per-device credentials, given to each unit at the factory, belong here too.

Three details are easy to miss:

  • Factory reset must really erase. A reset that clears the app pairing but leaves Wi-Fi passwords, account tokens or location history in flash does not protect the next owner. Test it by reading the flash of a reset unit; the CRA later asks for exactly this, the ability to “remove on a permanent basis all data and settings”.
  • Logs are data too. Diagnostic logs that record user names, locations or network names need the same protection as the data itself, or should not record them.
  • Advertising can leak. A Bluetooth LE device that broadcasts a fixed name or serial number lets anyone nearby track it; check what your advertising packets reveal.

Password design that keeps the presumption

The Official Journal notice is specific: the presumption is lost if the user “is allowed not to set and use any password” under clauses 6.2.5.1 and 6.2.5.2. If your product uses passwords anywhere (a device web page, a local API, an app pairing step), there should be no path that leaves them unset.

Two designs avoid the problem. Either each unit ships with its own unique credential, printed on a label or delivered in the app, or the user must set a password during setup with no way to continue without one. The UK’s product security regulations take a similar line for consumer products: passwords must be “unique per product” or “defined by the user of the product”.

Article 3(3)(f): support protection from fraud

This applies only to internet-connected equipment that moves money, monetary value or virtual currency. It points to authenticated transactions, integrity protection on the data that authorizes payments, and logging that supports dispute handling.

The same work, mapped to the CRA

RED requirement Typical firmware work Closest CRA Annex I, Part I point
3(3)(d) network Backoff, minimal open services, input validation, update path (h) availability and resilience against denial-of-service; (i) minimise impact on other devices or networks; (j) limit attack surfaces
3(3)(e) privacy Encryption, access control, protected storage, data deletion (d) protection from unauthorised access; (e) confidentiality; (g) data minimisation; (m) permanent removal of all data and settings
3(3)(f) fraud Authenticated transactions, integrity protection, logging (f) integrity; (l) recording and monitoring relevant internal activity
All three Signed updates, no default passwords, secure defaults (b) secure by default configuration; (c) vulnerabilities addressed through security updates

Signed updates sit under several rows. The keys that sign them, and how to keep them, are covered in firmware signing keys.

December 11, 2027: what changes

On December 11, 2027 the RED cybersecurity act stops applying and the CRA’s main obligations begin. Which rules apply to a unit depends on when that individual unit is placed on the market, not when the product model was launched.

The repeal

Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/339 says: “Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/30 is repealed with effect from 11 December 2027.” The Commission adopted it on February 16, 2026, and its RED page says it was published in the Official Journal on April 29, 2026. Its reasoning is that the CRA’s essential cybersecurity requirements “include all the elements of the essential requirements referred to in Article 3(3), points (d), (e) and (f)”, so keeping both would subject radios to two sets of cybersecurity rules.

EN 18031 presumption RED act 2022/30 CRA reporting, Art. 14 CRA main obligations RED EU-type certificates with OJ restrictions valid until June 11, 2028 Nov 2026 Dec 11, 2027 20252026202720282029
Figure 2. When the RED cybersecurity rules, EN 18031 and the CRA apply to radio products. The EN 18031 bar runs from the standard's citation in the Official Journal to the repeal of the requirements it supports. The certificate bar starts at August 1, 2025 for display only. Sources: Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/138; Delegated Regulations (EU) 2022/30, 2023/2444 and 2026/339; Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Articles 69 and 71; all on EUR-Lex, checked November 22, 2026.

Units placed before the date

The repeal does not wipe the slate clean. Recital 5 of Regulation 2026/339 says it “does not affect the Union market surveillance and control” under the RED of radio equipment placed on the market between August 1, 2025 and December 10, 2027. Authorities can still check those units against Article 3(3)(d), (e) and (f).

Under CRA Article 69(2), products placed on the market before December 11, 2027 fall under the CRA “only if, from that date, those products are subject to a substantial modification”. Article 69(3) adds one exception: the Article 14 reporting obligations apply to all in-scope products placed before that date. Those reporting obligations have applied since September 11, 2026.

Each unit counts separately

The Commission’s Blue Guide explains that the concept of making available “refers to each individual product, not to a type of product”, that “each individual product can only be placed once on the Union market”, and that products must comply with the legislation applicable “at the moment of placing on the market”. In practice, a unit that you or your importer first supply to a distributor or customer on December 10, 2027 is a RED unit, and its identical twin first supplied on December 11 is a CRA unit.

Planning the cutover for stock and updates

The Blue Guide also says that when a manufacturer or importer supplies a product “to a distributor or an end-user for the first time, the operation is always labelled in legal terms as ‘placing on the market’”. Later sales between distributors are making available, not placing.

Units you sell to a distributor before December 11, 2027 have therefore been placed under the RED rules, even if a shop sells them in 2028. Units still in your own warehouse on that date have not.

That gives a product team three practical decisions:

  1. Last RED shipment. Decide whether to build and ship extra stock to distributors before the date, knowing those units stay under RED market surveillance.
  2. First CRA unit. Decide which hardware revision and firmware version will be the first one placed under the CRA, and have its conformity assessment done before then.
  3. Updates to RED units. Keep shipping security updates to units already in the field; the CRA’s substantial modification test decides whether a later feature update pulls them under the CRA.

Certificates issued under the RED

If a notified body issues an EU-type examination certificate covering the RED cybersecurity requirements, CRA Article 69(1) says such certificates “shall remain valid until 11 June 2028, unless they expire before that date”. That is a short runway for a product line planned to sell for years, so plan the CRA assessment alongside the RED one rather than after it.

What will not happen

The Commission’s RED page also records that a separate initiative under RED Article 3(3)(i), on software loaded into reconfigurable radio equipment, was abandoned on January 20, 2026. There is no extra RED software-loading rule to prepare for. The full CRA timeline, the substantial modification test and the reporting clocks are covered in the EU Cyber Resilience Act for device startups.

Products that become “important” under the CRA

Some radio products that sit under the RED’s wearable, toy or childcare categories today appear in the CRA’s list of important products. For those, self-assessment after December 11, 2027 depends on applying harmonised standards, common specifications or a European cybersecurity certification scheme in full.

CRA Annex III, Class I, includes “smart home products with security functionalities, including smart door locks, security cameras, baby monitoring systems and alarm systems”. It also lists “internet connected toys” with social interactive or location tracking features, and “personal wearable products to be worn or placed on a human body that have a health monitoring (such as tracking) purpose”, where the medical device Regulations do not apply, or that are intended for children.

For Class I products, CRA Article 32(2) requires EU-type examination or full quality assurance where the manufacturer “has not applied or has applied only in part harmonised standards, common specifications or European cybersecurity certification schemes”, or where none exist. The structure mirrors RED Article 17(4). If your product is on that list, ask your notified body now how it plans to handle the move.

Example (fictional). A startup sells a Bluetooth LE baby monitor that streams to a phone app. Under the RED today it is childcare radio equipment, so (e) applies, and through the phone it likely reaches the internet, so (d) applies too.

Its app offers a “skip password for now” button. Under the Official Journal notices, that button removes the presumption of conformity for the password clauses, so the team either removes it or plans a notified body assessment. Because baby monitoring systems also appear in CRA Annex III, Class I, the team asks the same notified body about its CRA timeline in the same meeting.

A plan for wireless products shipping to the EU in 2026 and 2027

Treat RED cybersecurity as a near-term certification task and the CRA as the same engineering work with a different legal wrapper. The steps below are ordered so that nothing is done twice.

  1. Classify the product. Write down which Article 1 categories of Regulation 2022/30 apply, with the reasoning for “via any other equipment” and for personal data.
  2. Buy the standard parts that apply. Read EN 18031-1, and -2 or -3 where relevant, against your design, clause by clause.
  3. Check the restrictions. Remove any setup path that lets a user skip a password; for toys, childcare and wearables, design parental or guardian access control where the standard calls for it.
  4. Decide the route. If you can apply the parts in full, internal production control is open to you; otherwise, book a notified body from NANDO.
  5. Build the firmware evidence. Signed updates with tested rollback, unique per-device credentials, closed debug ports, minimal network services, reconnection backoff, and a written description of each.
  6. Write the documentation once. Organise the technical file so each RED requirement points to the same evidence you will later map to CRA Annex I.
  7. Plan the date. Decide which units will be placed before December 11, 2027 and which after, and whether any planned update could be a substantial modification.
  8. Set up reporting. If your products are already on the EU market, Article 14 reporting has applied to them since September 11, 2026.

Questions to ask your test lab or notified body

  • Which EN 18031 parts and clauses do you consider applicable to this product, and why?
  • Does our setup flow trigger the password notice, and if so, what would you need to see?
  • For a Bluetooth LE or Thread device that reaches the internet through a gateway or phone, how do you read “via any other equipment”?
  • Which firmware changes after the declaration would you expect us to bring back to you?
  • If you issue an EU-type examination certificate now, how do you plan the CRA assessment for units placed after December 11, 2027?

The firmware items in step 5 are the core of connectivity and firmware security work alike. Consumer products face the tightest version of these rules, which is why connected consumer products start this work at the first prototype rather than at certification.

What to do next

Decide this quarter which route your product will take, because booking a notified body or redesigning a setup flow can take longer than the firmware changes themselves.

  • Classify the product against Delegated Regulation 2022/30, Article 1, and record why.
  • Check the consolidated text of Implementing Decision 2022/2191 for the current EN 18031 entries and notices.
  • Review the app and device setup flows for any way to skip a password.
  • List the evidence your firmware already produces: signed releases, rollback tests, debug lock checks, per-device identity.
  • Decide which units ship before December 11, 2027, and plan the CRA assessment for the rest.

If you want a second reader for the firmware side of that plan, a firmware review covers the schematics, any existing code, the flash layout and the update plan, and ends with a written plan that lists the risks and the order of work. It does not replace a notified body or legal advice.

Facing this decision on a real device?

If this article describes a choice in front of you, a firmware review puts it in writing for your board, your code and your update plan.

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